UPDATE: Seems that Jacob Beeders over at Bellingcat scooped this one by a couple of hours – https://www.bellingcat.com/news/africa/2017/03/21/happened-kulbiyow-somalia-open-source-investigation/ Their analysis is supported here – that the Al-Kataib imagery can be matched to various parts of the NTV footage filmed after the attack (ironically in a KDF-run press tour intended to discredit Al-Shabaab claims to have overrun the base). In some places, our and Bellingcat’s specific points of analysis and verification match (for instance, stills of the makeshift church with the blue tarpaulin and of three distinctly parked vehicles). The following includes some additional material from The Nation and the NTV base tour, and further matches these sources against satellite imagery of the base, and Al-Kataib imagery.
The 27 January Al-Shabaab attack on a KDF base at Kulbiyow followed a familiar pattern for attacks on military bases in the region, in more ways than one. Not only did the initially reported details of the attack seem all too familiar (an early morning VBIED followed by a massed ground assault by militants), but conflicting media reports, claims and denials in the aftermath of the attack, also followed a recognizable pattern.
Early media reports largely repeated the basics of an Al-Shabaab press announcement (which came out on the same day as the attack). These reports were supposedly corroborated to some extent by local media through witness reports, and described the KDF base as being overrun, with heavy casualties inflicted on KDF forces. Incidentally, the Kulbiyow attack took place one year and a few days after a very similar attack on another KDF base, at el-Adde, further north in Somalia. There, Al-Shabaab fighters of the overrun with heavy casualties. There, as at Kulbiyow, the immediate response from KDF press relations, and the Kenyan Defence Ministry, was to issue denials of reports that heavy casualties had been suffered and a base overrun. In the case of el-Adde, months later, the KDF was forced to later admit that the garrison had been almost entirely wiped out (140+ KIA).
In the days following the Kulbiyow attack, Al-Kataib, the media arm of al-Shabaab, released a set of images purportedly from the attack. The KDF and Kenyan Ministry of Defence doubled down on its counter-claims that reports of heavy KDF casualties were false, and that it was the militants who had in fact suffered a beating.
Kenyan media also interviewed Major Dennis Girenge, the base commander at the time of the attack, who outright denied reports that the base had been overrun. Girenge had been evacuated for gunshot wounds. In the same article, another soldier, who was also wounded and claimed to have played dead among his dead compatriots at a machine gun post, described seeing truckloads of dead Al-Shabaab militants being carried away.
The competing accounts of the battle can be divided into two broad narratives:
- The Al-Shabaab claim, reported by some local media and supposedly corroborated by witnesses : That the base was overrun; Heavy KDF casualties; Vehicles were destroyed and equipment looted
- KDF/Def Ministry account: Base was not overrun; Light KDF casualties; Al-Shabaab VBIEDs and troop concentrations detected and destroyed.
Digging into the specifics made available in the various accounts provide a wide range of overlapping details, several minor inconsistencies that could be chalked up to misinterpretation or minor confusion. But the central points of disagreement are significant.
The imagery released by Al-Kataib appears to show a base that has been, or is in the process of being overrun. While that imagery does show several KDF casualties, it does not show the 50+ casualties claimed by Al-Shabaab. Nevertheless, it does show militants within the perimeter of the base. If the base is not completely overrun, then the images of flags being raised over burning vehicles and bunkers, while militants wander about, carrying away arms and ammunition, must at least suggest a base’s perimeter was breached and defensive forces were suppressed, for at least some period of time. That would run contrary to the main thrust of the narrative put forward by the KDF – that the attack was comprehensively defeated.
This then raises a question of verification: is the Al-Kataib imagery in fact from Kulbiyow?
A starting point in this regard, was to locate the base itself.
A 2014 satellite images showing the base (circled in red), alongside the border, with Kulbiyow/Kolbio town to the east.
Progress on the development of the base at Kulbiyow from 2002 through to 2014
The latest available image of the base – December 2016. Note the extended second perimeter fence, and large deadzone of cleared brush, and the half-moon of tents outside of the main perimeter.
THE MEDIA TOUR
In the aftermath of the attack, the KDF invited media to visit the base. During tour, video footage of the base was shot from the helicopter carrying The Nation press team. A horse-shoe shaped collection of structures can be seen, visible in the 2016 satellite imagery.
The tour itself starts with possible explosions in the background from an unknown source – disturbed carrion birds fly off and plumes of dust or smoke are visible as the soldiers look around hurriedly. “All is well, all is well” says the tour leader, Major George Osano – the new base commander.
During a tour of a crater outside the base perimeter, Major George Odanga explains that indirect fire destroyed a VBIED – leaving behind the crater. Leaf springs, described by Odanga as intentionally stored in the vehicle to serve as extra shrapnel, are neatly piled in a hole. This site is described as being 600m from camp – which Odanga specifically claims is the closest that the militants got to the base.
“Where is the rest of this vehicle?” “That is the engine … you are lucky you got the engine”.
Remnants of a VBIED, purportedly destroyed by indirect mortar fire – an unlikely claim on its own, and also in contradiction of other accounts from interviews which said the first VBIED was engaged by either an RPG or an 84mm weapon (possibly an M3 Carl Gustav).
MATCHING SATELLITE IMAGES TO DRONE FOOTAGE
The NTV special ends with an additional snippet of aerial imagery made available by the KDF – a short, sped-up video feed from a drone that purportedly observed the base on the day of the attack. The NTV news team mistakenly calls it “satellite video surveillance of the camp”. In the video, per KDF claims, KDF personnel are visible in the base after having defeated Al-Shabaab militants. The video itself is inconclusive in this regard (there is no way to independently verify if the figures seen in the video are in fact KDF personnel). However, this video proves to be vital for tying together the available satellite imagery to on-the-ground images from both the NTV base tour, and the Al-Kataib imagery purportedly showing Al-Shabaab militants during the attack.
Stitched together stills from the KDF drone footage of the base on the day of the attack matches the December 2016 satellite imagery of the candidate site.
- Further commonality with satellite imagery of the candidate site – the perimeter dotted with bunkers, and collection of bunkers within that perimeter again appear similar (if not conclusively so) with the satellite imagery. The major geographic points of commonality are the peculiar bodies of water within the base.
- The drone video feed is uncensored – telemetry reveals the altitude, orientation, and latitude/longitudinal coordinates of the drone at the time of recording. While somewhat imprecise (for unknown reasons) – they appear to put it in the general vicinity of the primary candidate base.
Notables in the drone feed images are:
Scorch marks around bunkers several bunkers and vehicles
Some vehicles are visible – but oddly dispersed on and within the perimeter.
Possible VBIED detonation site on the perimeter of the base.
Matching and verifying sources: Satellite imagery, the NTV flyover, the KDF drone footage
2013 satellite image
2016 satellite image
NTV footage of their flight into the base
KDF drone footage of the base on the day of the attack
Together, the satellite imagery, NTV ground and aerial video, and KDF drone video appear to show the same site. Next up: Verifying the Al-Kataib imagery:
THE MORTAR PIT
During the NTV video, the news crew are treated to a (somewhat awkwardly choreographed) live-firing of the mortar to demonstrate how the weapon was employed during the attack. (As a side note, the round appears to be a live).
During the sequence, a shelter is visible which appears to match a similar structure seen in an Al-Kataib image.
Note the sandbag barrier, the door-way of the shelter, the makeshift cot inside the shelter, and the vehicle tire against the HESCO barrier.
In another still taken from the NTV footage, a blue structure is briefly seen in the background. This appears to match a structure shown in the Al-Kataib images:
The same blue building (makeshift church which Al-Shabaab militants are seen inside).
THE THREE TRUCKS AND TANKER
Three cargo trucks and a water tanker – seen in the Al-Kataib footage from the base attack, in the KDF drone footage shown during the NationTV report, and in the December 2016 satellite imagery.
THE GREEN AND GREY ROOFS
In a The Nation article relating to the NTV visit to Kulbiyow, several stills taken by the press crew show the base on the ground and from the air. One image appeared to be a good candidate to match against the three trucks – but appears to be slightly off target (and the trucks might have been moved in the 10 days since the attack). Nonetheless, the image shows at least one permanent structure, and one of the two prominent geographic features of the base – large pools of water.
An image from the Al-Kataib release, showing an Al-Shabaab militant (note the red scarf worn by the attackers) advancing toward a grey-roofed house – a rare permanent structure among all of the makeshift shelters.
Two Al-Shabaab militants carry an LMG mount past several vehicles. The green roofed house is visible on the right of the image.
A second Al-Kataib still image, panned right from the previous image – note the green roof house, the front of a HMMWV and marker stick. Further to the right is a green shack, and a grey-roof house.
THE MYSTERY ARTILLERY
Within the HESCO barriers is an artillery piece. Two such weapons are shown in more detail below.
105-mm L5 Pack Howitzer derived from an Italian OTO Melara Mod 56. These may be sourced from the UK military or they may be a Norinco-made Type 56 clones. The fate of these weapons is unknown.
THE MACHINE GUN POST
In another The Nation still image from the NTV visit to the base, some KDF soldiers are seen manning a post on the perimeter. On the right is a Carl Gustav launcher, presumably to guard against VBIEDs.
KDF machine gun team. Note the sandbag arrangement, vertical uprights (with notches on the wood) and the handmade bench.
Verifying the location of the attack does not in turn automatically verify the Al-Kataib video – but it appears fairly safe to conclude that that imagery is indeed really from Kulbiyow. That, in and of itself is interesting, since that imagery was released before the NTV piece, and interviews with the base commander.
In addition, it must be asked that, if not from Kulbiyow, where would that imagery have come from? What was the mindset behind the KDF’s blanket denials of the authenticity of the imagery?
It should be noted that, as always, the imagery released by Al-Kataib, is fundamentally propaganda material. It is intended to convey a particular message, and could be purposefully manipulated and shaped to portray a particular narrative of events on that day.
At this stage, the following conclusions can be drawn: the KDF did not handily fend off the Al-Shabaab attack as it claims. The perimeter was indeed breached – and sufficiently so to allow the Al-Shabaab militants to loot the base.
Sometime in the coming months (following previous release timetables for post-attack propaganda by Al-Shabaab through Al-Kataib), a video of the attack will likely be released. That video will show the ground assault, probably from multiple camera angles. It may give some clues as to the intensity of the fighting at the base perimeter, and inside the base. It may show whether KDF forces were coordinated in their defence, or not, and whether or not they retreated. Some media accounts, citing anonymous KDF personnel, claimed that portions of the defensive force retreated from the base, and presumably later returned. Such a scenario would best match what appears to be evident so far.